Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave
Things to the Proxies?  Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 125
March 2020 by Biscop, Sven
  
 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
No. [ ] 
[Date] 
No. 125 
March 2020 
Trump, the Middle East, and North Africa: Just Leave 
Things to the Proxies? 
Sven Biscop 
When Trump says that he wants 
NATO to take more responsibility in 
the Middle East, what he means is that 
he wants the European allies to do 
more. He is campaigning for re-
election and has promised to bring the 
boys (and girls) home for Christmas. 
And of course, in Iraq American 
troops are less than welcome these 
days, after the targeted assassination 
of Iranian General Soleimani near 
Baghdad airport (3 January 2020). In 
late 2019, Trump had already 
withdrawn most troops from Syria, 
and now the peace agreement with the 
Taliban (29 February 2020) will allow 
him to draw down the US military 
presence in Afghanistan too. And the 
US is considering pulling its troops 
out of the Sahel as well. What does this 
mean for Europe? 
 
 
 
The Afghanistan deal is a good thing, because 
withdrawal at some point was inevitable: 
American and European troops cannot stay in 
Afghanistan forever. It’s not because Trump 
decided it that it cannot be a wise decision – 
though one that should have been taken years 
ago. Since we must leave anyway, some sort of 
agreement leaves some hope for a stable future in 
the country, although it will be an uphill struggle. 
 
When it comes to Iraq, however, Europeans can 
rightfully claim that the Americans have created a 
mess that they now leave for Europe to clean up. 
A good many of the current problems in the 
region can still be traced back to the original sin 
(of the 21st century, at least) of the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq. The forces that the destruction of the 
Iraqi state unleashed have yet to be tamed. But 
part of the mess is also of the Europeans’ own 
making. It was Britain and France that convinced 
the US to intervene in Libya in 2011, not the 
other way around. That intervention directly 
triggered the escalation of the crisis in Mali, and 
probably contributed to the start of the uprising 
in Syria. All three countries are still in turmoil. 
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Whoever is to blame for which particular 
problem, the fact is that many problems remain, 
in Europe’s backyard in the Middle East and 
North Africa, and so Europeans will have no 
choice but to address them. 
 
OPERATIONS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN   
There is little appetite in Europe to deploy more 
troops to the region. In the first instance, limited 
numbers will likely have to be sent nonetheless, 
to replace Americans in the training mission in 
Iraq. Arguably however, no further significant 
increase will be required, unless of course an 
escalation or a new crisis occurs. If Europeans 
had been envisaging a large-scale deployment on 
the ground (which they never really did), the 
moment for that has now passed. 
 
In Syria, for a while the war appeared to be 
grinding down into a stalemate. Russia and Iran 
had achieved their war aim, keeping Assad in 
power, while the US and Europe, focusing on the 
destruction of ISIS, gave support to some of the 
opposition but did not directly intervene against 
the Assad regime. As the warring parties were 
wearing themselves out and the foreign powers 
involved would not help them to decisively defeat 
each other, different groups seemed likely to end 
up in control of different territories. 
 
At that time, Europeans could have decided 
whether any of these groups merited their 
permanent support, and if so, whether that would 
include military support. This debate never 
happened, however, and the window closed. 
Russia and Turkey stepped up their intervention, 
setting Assad on the path to regaining control of 
nearly all of Syria. When in late 2019 Trump 
suddenly pulled the majority of US troops out of 
northern and eastern Syria, abandoning the 
West’s Kurdish allies and allowing Turkey to 
move in and establish a “safe zone”, Europe was 
placed for a fait accompli. A few hundred US 
troops remain in the far east of Syria, “to secure 
the oil”, as Trump ordered. 
 
Europeans reacted very upset, but if they felt that 
a military presence there was so important for 
their security or to protect the Kurds, why did 
they not move in themselves when they still had 
the chance? After all, Trump’s pull-out was 
sudden when it came, but had been in the making 
for quite some time, and so a gradual relief of 
American troops by Europeans could have been 
planned. 
 
Now the Kurds have made their pact with Assad 
to protect themselves from Turkey. And if 
Turkey has overreached and is creating 
flashpoints with Assad and his Russian backers, it 
is not up to Europe to provide a military solution. 
Those who call for a real safe zone for the civilian 
population must realise that a no-fly zone will not 
create safety, while an intervention on the ground 
in between Turkish, Russian, and Syrian forces 
would demand a very large-scale deployment, 
backed-up by serious firepower, or the 
Europeans troops would be at the mercy of the 
others. This is not a job for a battalion-sized EU 
Battlegroup. No European government is willing 
to commit such a large force and to potentially 
engage in combat. Europeans will have to make 
their own pact, therefore, for only a political 
agreement can provide a lasting solution, 
between Turkey, Russia, and Syria, and for all the 
people of Syria. 
 
In Libya, there was limited political follow-up to 
the successful air campaign, which won the war 
for the opposition against Khadafi. It is 
questionable whether military intervention on the 
ground could ever have helped, in view of the 
fractiousness of the Libyan opposition. But if it 
should have been attempted at all, then the time 
was shortly after the fall of Khadafi, when it had 
become clear that the country was not coming 
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together. In the current state of affairs, and even 
after an agreement between the main contenders 
for political power, in Libya too any military 
intervention would have to be very large-scale 
and ready to fight in order to hold its own against 
all possible spoilers. Again, this is not the kind of 
operation that any European government is 
willing to launch. 
 
The ongoing EU Training Mission in Mali 
(EUTM) was enabled by a French military 
intervention in 2013, Operation Serval, and some 
5000 French troops remain in the country on 
Operation Barkhane as the backbone of the 
international presence, which includes the 15,000 
strong United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali 
(MINUSMA). The question can be asked 
whether Europeans should not have contributed 
more troops to MINUSMA itself, to increase its 
effectiveness. The EU and many Member States 
are also present in Niger and support other Sahel 
countries as well. 
 
MILITARY: OVER THE HORIZON 
All in all, Europeans need not send significantly 
more troops to the region now, because the 
European objective is limited. Only vis-à-vis ISIS 
did Americans and Europeans pursue an 
unlimited war aim: its total destruction. That 
having been (nearly) achieved, the European 
objective is not to destroy a particular opponent 
nor to remodel certain states and societies, but to 
maintain sufficient security and stability in the 
region for Europe’s interests not to be jeopardised. 
 
Direct use of force by Europeans must only be 
considered therefore if, for example, a conflict 
threatens to spill over onto EU/NATO territory, 
to cut off Europe’s connectivity, or to generate 
migration towards Europe at such a scale that 
only restoring peace can prevent it. If the UN 
were to activate the mechanism of the 
Responsibility to Protect (which is very unlikely 
given the divisions between the five permanent 
members), that too would require European 
participation in whichever action the Security 
Council decides upon. 
 
For a long-term strategy, Europeans can pursue 
the current “indirect approach”:1 building the 
capacity of national military and security forces, 
supported by regional troops when necessary, 
and with a European military backbone only if an 
acceptable degree of stability cannot otherwise be 
guaranteed (as in Mali). This limited military 
presence on the ground serves, first of all, to 
influence the strategy of the states of the region, 
so that it would not run counter to Europe’s 
security. At the same time, a light but effective 
footprint will reduce the chance that European 
forces would overstay their welcome, for in many 
states of the region their presence, from a 
European point of view, will likely be required for 
many years to come. 
 
A semi-permanent military presence has also 
become a geopolitical imperative, however, 
because where Europe leaves a vacuum, Russia 
and China move in, including in the immediate 
periphery of Europe. And Europe cannot allow 
Russia or China to steer its neighbours’ strategies 
in a direction that would undermine its security. 
That will happen, however, if Europe remains 
unable to transfer weapons to its partners, in 
addition to training their forces. Troops cannot 
go into combat unarmed. If Europe does not 
supply lethal equipment, then its partners will 
turn to someone who will, and that often is 
Russia. The European Peace Facility must 
include the possibility to transfer arms. 
 
Even an “indirect approach” requires strategic 
enablers, however, and over-the-horizon 
reserves. 
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Enablers include in particular transport and all 
types of intelligence. Europeans have but limited 
capacity in these areas; most enablers are 
provided by the US. If in the context of the US 
troop reduction these enablers would be 
withdrawn, Europeans would be hard put to 
replace them. Even in Mali, where we see the 
largest European presence in the region, 
American enablers play a vital role. Furthermore, 
whenever and wherever a single American soldier 
is deployed, there will be a reserve, in a high state 
of readiness, to extricate or reinforce him/her if 
necessary. Again, Europe’s own capacity is very 
limited; in fact, when Europeans deploy 
alongside Americans, they rely on the US over-
the-horizon reserve. 
 
These shortfalls cannot be remedied in the short 
term. The point of the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP) when it was created 
in 1999 was exactly that: to allow for autonomous 
European operations in Europe’s periphery, up 
to corps level (60,000 troops). More than twenty 
years later, this so-called Headline Goal has still 
not been achieved. The EU has now created new 
instruments, notably Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO). This should be its 
priority: to create a coherent full spectrum force 
package capable, at the very least, of power 
projection in Europe’s broad neighbourhood. 
 
Generating the capabilities by aligning national 
forces through the EU does not mean that 
Europeans always have to deploy under the EU 
flag. In a crisis, the circumstances of the moment 
will determine whether to deploy on an EU, 
NATO, UN or coalition operation. However, it 
does seem logical for the semi-permanent 
European military capacity-building presence to 
be organised through the CSDP, for it will be one 
aspect of an encompassing integrated approach, 
which Europeans put into effect through the EU. 
The US cannot expect to pull out its forces yet 
continue to control things through NATO. The 
Europeans are more than proxies for the US. 
 
DIPLOMACY: ON THE HORIZON? 
Capacity-building only makes sense indeed if it is 
part and parcel of an overall strategy, which for 
the Europeans the EU is best set to provide. 
Even the best trained and equipped national 
forces in Europe’s periphery will not fight for a 
state whose project they do not believe in. Once 
again, the European objective is limited, 
however. The aim is not necessarily to create 
democratic states along the European model. The 
EU aim must be to have a ring of states around 
Europe that provide sufficiently effective as well 
as inclusive government for them to appeal to the 
broad population. That is a precondition for their 
military and security forces to be able to uphold 
a sufficient degree of security and stability, so as 
to maintain that public support and, in the end, 
to prevent the emergence of threats to the 
European interest. 
 
If the internal dynamics in a country lead to 
democratisation, the EU must of course support 
that, for well-governed democratic states are 
more likely to generate durable stability. Where 
democracy is established, the EU might even 
have to consider whether it could offer a certain 
security guarantee – but this is a type of question 
that so far the Europeans have never been willing 
to ask themselves. Artificially triggering or 
accelerating democratisation would be counter-
productive. Human rights promotion, on the 
contrary, is an indispensable part of the integrated 
approach, because by their very nature they are 
universal – they are human rights, not European 
rights, and protecting them is a moral duty 
whenever and wherever one acts. Pragmatism 
must prevail, though: a gradual and country-
specific approach is called for, which does not 
upset the overall strategy. 
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This Realpolitik may be frustrating – one would 
wish that one could do a lot more for democracy 
and human rights – but strategy requires the 
capacity to accept the result of a rational analysis 
of what is possible, even if it is not the result one 
had hoped for. Staying true to Europe’s values in 
foreign policy does not mean exporting the 
European way of life or cooperating only with 
those who share or aspire to it. In order to 
safeguard the European way of life, the EU must 
be able to cooperate with any regime, as long as 
by doing so it does not itself become party to the 
human rights violations that a regime might 
commit. The only red line would probably be 
regimes that are guilty of the crimes that can 
trigger the Responsibility to Protect: genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity. 
 
Where the EU has a strategy, it has been relatively 
effective, not in the least because if one has a clear 
idea of one’s objectives, one can be proactive. EU 
strategy for the Sahel is one of the better 
examples of European strategizing. Nevertheless, 
even a good strategy does not guarantee good 
results. For a while it seemed the situation was 
being contained, and Europe’s security interests 
guaranteed, but things are turning ugly again in 
Mali. That is why the option should remain on 
the table to contribute more Europeans troops to 
MINUSMA, among other measures, but that 
would only make sense if the Security Council 
would grant it a more robust mandate. 
 
With regard to Libya, the EU has supported the 
UN-recognized Government of National Accord 
in Tripoli, yet without a concrete plan to help it 
achieve control of the country. At the same time, 
France in effect began to support its contender, 
General Haftar. Such an intra-EU divide makes it 
impossible, of course, to agree on an effective 
strategy. Russia and Turkey have filled the 
diplomatic and military void left by the EU, 
which tried to take back the initiative at the Berlin 
Conference called by Chancellor Merkel (19 
January 2020). The EU must now stay at the 
forefront of the diplomatic efforts, and make a 
comprehensive offer for close relations, including 
military assistance (conditional, of course, upon 
the end of hostilities and a political agreement 
between the main parties), in order to be in a 
position of influence strong enough to safeguard 
the European interest. A significant “EUTM 
Libya” is in order. 
 
Europeans did not, and still do not have a 
strategy for the Middle East and the Gulf (with 
whose security it is inextricably linked). They did 
have two objectives: to destroy ISIS, and to 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. 
The first has been nearly achieved through the 
US-led coalition, the second through the JCPOA, 
which has since been undone by the US. 
Europeans never had a strategy beyond those two 
important but intermediate objectives, however: 
Which political end-state do they seek in Iraq and 
in Syria? How do they see the future of the EU’s 
relations with Turkey? Which regional order do 
they pursue that could gain the agreement of both 
Iran and Saudi Arabia? The 2016 EU Global 
Strategy actually stated that the EU “will deepen 
dialogue with Iran and GCC countries on 
regional conflicts, human rights and counter-
terrorism, seeking to prevent contagion of 
existing crises and foster the space for 
cooperation and diplomacy”, but it never acted 
on that. Without clear strategic goals a proactive 
role is impossible. The EU was thus forever 
reacting to events, and still is. 
 
The US is reducing its military presence in the 
immediate crisis zones. 2 Its diplomatic strategy, 
which has directly undermined Europe’s security 
interests, has not changed. US withdrawal from 
the Iran nuclear deal has increased, rather than 
decreased, the risk of proliferation, and has 
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played into the hands of the hawks in Iran. 
Fighting between Iranian and Saudi proxies 
continues across the region. The Trump 
administration may in the end not go to war 
against Iran (though the risk remains), but if it 
continues to support Saudi Arabia in its quest for 
dominance of the Gulf, there will not be peace 
either. The EU has attempted, but failed, to shield 
its own companies doing business with Iran from 
American extra-territorial sanctions. A European 
coalition of the willing has launched a naval 
operation, European Maritime Awareness in the 
Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) in an attempt to 
demine the tensions. But the fact of the matter is 
that Europe alone does not have the leverage to 
alter the stance of the regional powers. Why 
would Riyadh consider compromise if 
Washington backs it unconditionally?  
 
Following the defeat of ISIS, Iraq needs a strong 
and effective government to set it on the road to 
stability and prosperity. If Europeans and 
American accept that they will have to negotiate 
with Assad (although that may be crossing a red 
line, but peace may otherwise never be achieved), 
for Syria perhaps a peace conference involving 
the regional players as well as the great powers 
could make some headway. EU diplomacy should 
be probing for possibilities. Closely consulting 
with Turkey would be a way towards restoring 
good working relations with Ankara (though the 
future form of the long-term EU-Turkey 
relationship remains in doubt). But the regional 
geopolitical competition between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia remains a massive nuisance factor. As 
long as the US does not change tack, a diplomatic 
solution does not seem to be on the horizon, 
neither for Iraq nor for Syria. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The European contribution to the security of the 
Middle East and North Africa is highly 
significant, especially in the coalition against ISIS 
and in the Sahel. Where the European military 
contribution (to UN, NATO, EU and coalition 
operations) has not been framed in a broad EU 
strategy, however, Europeans have not been able 
to create the circumstances that would safeguard 
their security interests in the long term. Several 
EU Member States have preferred to make policy 
outside the EU, in various informal formats, but 
in the end they have had but little impact on what 
the US does, and even less on the governments 
in the region.  
 
Europeans have power. But to leverage it, they 
need strategy, which in turns requires unity. 
Somehow I feel that I have written this before…  
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 ENDNOTES 
 
1 Sir Basil H. Liddell Hart, Strategy. Second Revised Edition. London, Faber & Faber, 1967.  
 
2 This does not affect America’s permanent military bases in the wider region: nearly 50,000 US troops remain in 
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates. 
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